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The article aims to explore whether the accuracy of voters' perceptions of party ideology are affected by
party position shifts and by the media's turn to non-left-right issues, such as political leadership, during
election campaigns. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and a country-
speciﬁc left-right index based on data by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), multilevel analyses
reveal that emphasizing leadership issues can lead voters to reﬂect left-right positions more accurately. A
party's left-right position shift between elections does not lead to a signiﬁcant difference in voters'
perceptions, while a shift on the economic sub-dimension of left-right ideology can even lead voters to
more position clarity. However, multiple parties' shifting their positions seems to overburden re-
spondents' cognitive capacity.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Theories of electoral decision making suggest that citizens
should vote for the parties with which they identify, which have
policies that represent the citizens' own interests best, or which are
likely to change policies in their preferred direction (for example
Merrill and Grofman, 1999). This decision requires voters to
compare their own political stances with those of the parties.
Voters must either acquire the relevant information about impor-
tant political issues or at least have a sense of the parties' ideolo-
gies, which can serve as a ‘cue to vote choice’ (Downs, 1957).
Ideological locations must then function as a type of umbrella for a
broad range of single issues, which the voter does not necessarily
need to study separately.
In election campaigns, party manifestos are the most important
documents to determine the parties’ ideological positions. Ac-
cording to interviews with party elites, politicians strive to base all
of their campaign communications on these party manifestos
(Adams et al., 2011, 372). Hence, voters can inform themselves
about policy stances directly by reading manifestos or by simply
following the election campaign. If the campaign is successful for a
party, it communicates the most important messages from the
manifestos to the voter and thereby transports party ideology. If atd. This is an open access article uparty undergoes an ideological change from one election to the
next, a well-informed public should realize this fact. However,
recent research has suggested that the mean voter does not
perceive changes in party ideologies through party manifestos
(Adams et al., 2011, 2014). It is not yet clear what determines how
well the individual voter perceives these changes.
The aim of this research is to analyse the determinants that
foster or undermine the links between current party locations and
voters' perception of these positions. Speciﬁcally, it tests de-
terminants related to changes in party positions over time and the
saliency of political issues prior to elections to determine how
strongly voters' ideological pictures of parties are inﬂuenced by
current developments in the electoral campaign. Via multilevel
analysis, the inﬂuence of system and party level characteristics are
weighted against individual voter level inﬂuence on perceptual
accuracy. The basic theoretical argument that inspired this research
is that voters' knowledge of parties' current ideological locations is
important for their voting decisions. Shifts in party manifesto po-
sitions or the emergence of new parties can affect the left-right
locations of parties and even the organization of the important
parties within the party system. Voters thus must pay some
attention to changes to have a clear view of party ideology. If
important messages are not communicated to voters, they might
base their pictures of parties’ ideologies on outdated information
and perhaps vote for parties that do not represent them best
(anymore).nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
K.B. Busch / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 159e178160The research question can be located within the wider body of
research on ‘political knowledge’ or ‘political sophistication’
(Gordon and Segura, 1997; Granberg and Holmberg, 1988, Neuman,
1981, 1986), for which knowledge of party positions is a central
aspect of citizens' education. The innovative aspect of this investi-
gation is the linking of voter estimations to current manifesto in-
formation, as well as the question of how strongly party position
changes and issue saliency inﬂuence voters' perceptions. Apart
from individual level determinants, it thus also tests for the inﬂu-
ence of party behaviour and the structure of the party and electoral
system to communicate manifesto information. It is the ﬁrst study
to use left-right values from the ‘12-step index’ of manifesto data
(Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006) as the basis for the calculation ac-
curacy of individual level perception.1
Only if the salient issues within party manifestos form broadly
consistent ideological pictures do voters have the opportunity to
estimate precisely the parties’ locations in this one-dimensional
concept of political space, and only then can they choose the
party that best reﬂects their own ideological standpoints. Apart
from putting Downs to the test, the research question has several
implications.
Firstly, a vast amount of empirical research has connected the
ideological congruence of voters' preferences with their political
representatives (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Budge and McDonald,
2007; Golder and Stramski, 2010; Huber and Powell, 1994;
Klingemann et al., 2006; McDonald et al., 2004; Powell and
Vanberg, 2000; Warwick, 2010). This research assumes that
voters are able to integrate information about policy into a
consistent view of party ideology that is broadly shared by voters
and parties.2 If voters did not understand left-right positions, a
comparison between parties and voters’ ideological stands would
be a mere comparison of labels and not of ideological content.
Secondly, some researchers have argued that the policy-based
party-voter linkage is normatively preferable to other political
ties (Kitschelt, 1995). In an ideal world, well-informed voters could
compare their own self-interests with those of qualiﬁed political
candidates (Gastil, 2000: 32.) or parties. If voters cannot arrive at
consistent pictures of party ideologies, they might depend more
heavily on other cues to make choices regarding voting, such as
party leaders' charisma or clientelist ties. Such choices could be
problematic because elections won purely on the basis of charisma
or clientelist ties ‘invoke the centrality of the electoral process of
interest aggregation for the distribution of group and societal1 Adams et al. (2011, 2014) used the RILE index, which is included in the CMP
data, and they did not measure perceptions of party position changes on the in-
dividual level, but they compared respondents' perceptions in one year to that of
another year. Research that has not examined individual political knowledge has
used measurement of voters' party-speciﬁc mean estimates (Dahlberg, 2013;
Gordon and Segura, 1997; Granberg and Holmberg, 1988), to which single voter's
estimates have been compared. However, only the CMP data, to my knowledge,
contain information about current and previous party positions. Thus, they are the
best starting point to explore how well knowledge about current manifesto posi-
tions is conveyed to voters, as well as whether voters notice ideological shifts over
time.
2 It should be noted that the understanding of left and right can also vary be-
tween countries, but this source of bias will be addressed by using country-speciﬁc
indices of the CMP data. This process will be explained in greater detail below.
3 Electoral research has also found that some democratic elections have been
won mostly due to valence issues, such as which party will manage ‘the economy’
best or which party ‘performs best’ (Whiteley et al., 2005; Clarke et al., 2011).
However, even so-called valence issues can have relationships with political posi-
tions. For example, a respondent might believe that a speciﬁc party would handle
an economic crisis best, which could be categorized as a ‘valence’ issue, but this
‘best handling’ might also be cognitively related to the respondent's knowledge of
how the speciﬁc party would manage the crisis, i.e., through speciﬁc economic
policies.beneﬁts’ (Kitschelt, 1995: 450).
However, considering leadership evaluations in elections is not
necessarily problematic if it occurs in addition to issue consider-
ation.3 My analysis suggests that it can even draw attention to left-
right positions. In general, voters' mean estimations of parties on
the lefteright scale correspond well with the left-right positions of
the parties. On the individual level, the precision of a voter's party
estimation is best if the voter's own left-right position is close to
that of the party but is not ﬂawed by extremely positive affection.
The strength of a single party's change on the left-right axis does
not signiﬁcantly lead voters to estimate a party less precisely. If only
changes in economic political issues e the economic sub-
dimension of the lefteright scale e are analysed, a party's posi-
tion shift even has a slightly increasing effect on proximity of
voters' estimations to the party's manifesto positions. Contrarily,
the stronger that multiple parties change their positions on the
lefteright scale, the less accurately do voters estimate the parties'
positions. It is hence the position shifts of the many that clearly
decrease position clarity.
In the next section, I will elaborate further on the links to pre-
vious research on political knowledge and the precision of voters'
party estimations. I will then advance my argument that party
positioning behaviour and party system properties, such as the
number of parties, account for much of the difference between
voters' cognitions about parties' ideological locations. Using data
from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, Module 1
and 2, Full Releases) and the Comparative Manifesto Project
(CMP) (Klingemann et al., 2006), the multilevel analyses with hi-
erarchical linear models (HLM) in Section 6 will evaluate and
compare the determinants of estimation proximity on the indi-
vidual, party and system levels. This analysis includes 150,642 re-
spondents’ party projections in 25 post-election studies of
parliamentary elections, located in a variety of older Western and
younger Eastern European democracies.4 In the ﬁnal section, I
discuss the ﬁndings and their implications for future research.
2. Research on political knowledge and voter perceptions
Knowledge about party ideology is a type of political sophisti-
cation5 with a very practical value (Neuman, 1981; Gordon and
Segura, 1997). It is a prerequisite for issue voting because only if
voters have knowledge of party positions,6 they are able to vote for
the parties that represent their own interests best. To test for this
knowledge, respondents in election surveys are often asked to es-
timate parties' positions, most commonly along the political left-
right dimension. Researchers into political knowledge draw on
these data. They operationalize the precision of the individual
voter's estimation by subtracting the voter's estimate of a party's
ideological location from the mean of all voters' estimates of the
same party's location (Gordon and Segura, 1997; Granberg and
Holmberg, 1988; Neuman, 1981, 1986). Because not even party ex-
perts can know precisely what the ‘true’ ideological party position
is, this approach is legitimate because uses the ‘perceptually agreed
position’ (Dahlberg, 2013) as a valid point of reference.7 Other
research, which is also linked to the present study, has analysed
whether the mean of the voters indicates perception of ideological4 The full list of countries and parties in the sample can be found in Appendix 1.
5 In the following, the terms ‘political sophistication’ and ‘political knowledge’
denote the same concept, and I will use them interchangeably.
6 This knowledge is meant generally, both regarding the acknowledgement of
single party positions that are important to voters and regarding ideological vote
choices as a speciﬁc type of ‘issue voting’, in contrast with a mere party ID vote.
7 A problem with expert data is also that they are usually limited to one point in
time and hence do not capture changes in party positions between elections.
8 It should be noted here that the divergence measurement that Dahlberg
employed is the mean sum of its distances to all other parties weighted by their
respective electoral sizes. The distance to an electorally successful party is thus
weighted more strongly than the distance to an electorally less successful party.
9 For Dahlberg, this is a conﬁrmation of Kirchheimer's (1966) ‘catch-all’ hy-
pothesis (Dahlberg, 2013).
10 Researchers into political communication see the media as a powerful actor in
‘priming’, i.e., the weighting of speciﬁc political issues (see Gidengil et al., 2002:
76e77), so parties might only have an indirect inﬂuence on this process.
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by adopting positions or changing their party support (Adams et al.,
2014; Adams et al., 2012) While this study has a slightly different
focus e it seeks determinants that increase or decrease the link
between voters' estimations of party ideology and the parties'
current self-expressed ideologye it can nevertheless draw on some
of these ﬁndings from the research on political sophistication and
voter reactions to party changes.
2.1. Individual ability, psychological and system effects
Neuman's (1981) ground-breaking study of political knowledge
identiﬁed two intertwined dimensions of cognitive organization:
‘conceptual differentiation’ (the ‘ability to identify and discriminate
among the various political issues, actors, and events’) and ‘con-
ceptual integration’ (the ‘explicit organization of ideas and infor-
mation in terms of abstract or ideological constructs’) (Neuman,
1981: 1237). Analysing these cognitive abilities only in relation to
socio-demographic determinants, he found that education is most
strongly linked to conceptual integration (Neuman, 1981, 1986).
Later quantitative studies concentrated speciﬁcally on the psy-
chological determinants of individual voters' political knowledge
(Granberg and Holmberg, 1988; Merrill et al., 2001; Drummond,
2010). Granberg and Holmberg (1988) found, in their analyses of
voters in Sweden and the USA that emotional predispositions to-
wards parties could lead to strong misperceptions. If voters like a
party, they tend to exaggerate the party's similarity to their own
positions; if they dislike it, they exaggerate the differences and
place the party further away from their own political standpoints.
These ‘assimilation’ and ‘contrast’ effects are found across a variety
of political systems (Merrill et al., 2001). However, while contrast
effects are stronger in majoritarian systems, assimilation effects are
similarly strong under both majoritarian and proportional electoral
rules (Drummond, 2010).
Gordon and Segura (1997) showed that system-level impacts
inﬂuence voters' estimation abilities more strongly than individual
voter characteristics. Their explanation was that electoral systems
offer more or fewer incentives for voters to perceive information
about parties. For example, voters in single-party contexts perceive
less political information than voters in multiparty contexts
(Gordon and Segura, 1997). The assumption is that, in multiparty
systems, more parties have realistic chances of achieving leader-
ship in government. A greater number of parties makes the vote
decision more complex and provides an incentive for voters to
inform themselves more thoroughly. It should also lead the media
to distribute information about a greater number of parties.
Further, because the presence of more relevant parties in multi-
party systems leads to a potentially greater number of confronta-
tional issues (Sartori, 1976), information about parties’ positions
should be more detailed as well. In two-party systems, in contrast,
voters only need to know whether they roughly incline towards
party A or party B tomake rational vote decisions. They do not need
to consider as many parties as voters in multiparty systems, nor
must they know as many position details.
Dahlberg (2013) employed a three-level analysis to determine
the level of estimators that is most important for voters' ‘estimation
precision’. Examining the perceptions of multiple parties within
each party system, he found that, on average, party characteristics
are more important determinants of voters' party projections than
system determinants. In his model, the strongest effect is the result
of the divergence of a party's position, compared to all of the po-
sitions of other parties in the same country.
The accumulation of previous ﬁndings shows that multiple de-
terminants can inﬂuence voters' knowledge about party positions.
This study follows Gordon and Segura (1997) and Dahlberg (2013)by emphasizing system-level and party characteristics, but it also
controls for the known individual level effects on the political
perception. The main contribution of this paper is to test whether
party position changes, individual or aggregated over the party
system, confuse voters, and if voters’ estimation proximity to the
current party ideology is lower if the saliency before the election is
not related to left-right issues.3. Putting the spotlight on party behaviour and party system
structure
This study builds on Gordon and Segura's instrumental-rational
view of voters' knowledge and on Sartori's (1976) insights into
party competition structures. Parties are the crucial actors because,
if they do not manage to communicate their most important in-
formation or if they stay deliberately ambiguous during election
campaigns, voters cannot make correct issue-based voting de-
cisions. As Dahlberg (2013) found, it can be advantageous for voters'
left-right perceptions if parties take distinctive positions: the more
divergent that the party's position is to all other parties',8 the
higher the voters' perceptual agreement is to a party's left-right
position. Despite this potential advantage of parties to be
acknowledged for their concerns with speciﬁc issues, taking a very
divergent position does not generally conform to parties' strategies
to win votes. Rather the opposite is the case: usually, parties proﬁt
electorally from ‘broad appeal’ strategies (Somer-Topcu, 2014).
Parties then address a broad range of topics, and they sometimes
even show inter-party or intra-party personnel differences
regarding the same issues. As a result, issues appeal to a broader
range of the electorate, and voters' left-right estimations of these
parties can also vary more. In the same vein, Dahlberg (2013)
argued that it is easier for voters to locate electorally weaker
parties than very strong parties: the broader appeal of the latter
leads to less clear issue domination than smaller parties usually
exhibit.9
Apart from the parties' internal consistency regarding left-right
positions, the consistency over time of the political issues that the
parties present to the electorate should also be important for
voters' perceptions. If voters generally do not perceive parties'
ideology changes in party manifestos (Adams et al., 2011, 2014),
these changes will lead to misperceptions. Voters' perceptions can
be the results of their cognitive capacities, but they can also be
dependent on the media's attention to the parties and the saliency
of the issues which undergo changes. Further, parties can be more
or less effective in the issue domination of the election campaign.10
In the following, hypotheses are mainly drawn regarding party
position consistency over time and regarding campaign effects. I go
on to explain further which party system characteristics should be
important, and then I discuss the speciﬁc situation of the younger,
post-communist Eastern European democracies. To determine
whether voters' abilities, parties' behaviour or party system char-
acteristics determine voters' perceptions of current programmatic
information, each of these channels of inﬂuence is tested within
multilevel linear models.
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Research into party manifesto data has suggested that parties
have quite long-lasting ideological positions (Budge and
Klingemann, 2001; Adams, 2001). While they constantly make
small movements, major changes are quite rare, at least in the long-
established systems of Western Europe.11 Their shifts on the
lefteright scale are usually undertaken within limited areas of the
lefteright scale, in a type of zigzagging course.
On average, voters' perceptions of ideological changes in party
manifestos is low: if a party changes its left-right position in terms
of its manifesto, the mean of respondents does not position the
party signiﬁcantly more to the left or right than the mean of re-
spondents in the previous election (Adams and Somer-Topcu,
2009).12 If voters do not follow the position change of a party,
their perceptions of the party's left-right positionwill beworse, and
the stronger the party's position becomes. It is hence hypothesized
that.
(H1). The more the position of a party shifts over time, the lower
the voter's estimation proximity is to the party's ideological
position.
Over time, change sometimes results in party positions over-
lapping or in parties ‘leapfrogging’ each other, but by and large,
such leapfrogging only occurs between parties that are ideologi-
cally close to one another (Budge and Klingemann, 2001). The
reason that parties only seldom cross each other's left-right posi-
tions seems to be that they frequently adapt their policies in the
same direction as e and in response to e rival parties from the
same party family (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009) and to which
they are ideologically very closely positioned (Williams, 2015)13
However, even if parties do not leapfrog each other, multiple
party changes might make the estimating of party positions pre-
cisely a more difﬁcult task for respondents. A single party's change
within a pattern of parties changing in the same direction might be
less obvious. It should not be forgotten here that the task of esti-
mating the left-right position of a party is very abstract, while
parties' movement on the lefteright scale in terms of their mani-
festo stances might be simply evoked by a speciﬁc new left or right
issue added to their agendas. Voters of course will not calculate this
change; they can only have an approximate picture of parties' left-
right positions. Voters might even estimate party positions mainly
by comparing one party to the neighbouring parties or by ﬁrst
thinking about which party is in the centre of the scale and then
ordering the others around it, as research has suggested (Best,
2013). If multiple parties change in the same direction regarding
one or a few issues, and this includes the onewhich the respondent11 This statement must be tempered somewhat, because Klingemann et al. (2006)
showed that, in Portugal in the ﬁrst decade after its regime change, parties' left-
right positions were also very unstable, similar to the 1990 situation of parties in
the new democracies of Eastern Europe.
12 It should be noted that Adams and his colleagues' research was undertaken
using longitudinal cross-sectional data and not panel data. The comparison of the
party placement of the mean respondents is hence based on different samples.
Moreover, the researchers calculated the differences between the means of party
placement between years and not with regard to a speciﬁc question about party
position changes. While the mean placement of a speciﬁc party should indeed be
different if a party has changed its position over time, this type of measurement is
slightly error-prone. For example, sampling problems and outliers can render the
mean placements of different samples less reliable than if the same persons were
asked about changes in party positions.
13 There is also evidence that niche party behaviour, in terms of position change, is
different than mainstream party behaviour, with niche parties responding less to
public opinion shifts (Adams et al., 2006) and therefore being more stable position
keepers. However, because the focus of my analysis is on position change, this
research will not further distinguish between mainstream and niche parties.estimates, voters must ignore that all of these parties are taking
more left (more right) positions now and will thus have ‘moved’ to
the left (right) of the scale. However, in this situation, the speciﬁc
party to estimate does not take a more left (right) position relative
to the other parties than before. Its movement will be more difﬁcult
to notice and estimate than if its shift were the only shift that
occurred. But also in a situation in which multiple parties have
moved into multiple directions, the task of estimating a single
party's position within that system of manifold party shifts is also
likely to be more difﬁcult thanwithin a party system inwhich there
are not many position changes over time. The second hypothesis is
thus:
(H2). In a comparison between countries, the stronger the total of
all of the parties' positions shifts are except for the estimated,14 the
lower the voters' estimation proximity is to the parties' ideological
positions.3.2. Priming of topics in the election campaign
Apart from the hypothesized confusion of voters due to pro-
grammatic inconsistency, it is also likely that a large portion of
current information does not reach voters at all because most
voters do not inform themselves about programmatic positions
directly but use the media as an intermediate actor. Because the
media usually only cover a sample of current programmatic party
issues, those that are ‘primed’ (Gidengil et al., 2002), this commu-
nication means will already create differences between issues in
party manifestos and voter perceptions. Further, ‘priming’ not only
leads to an incomplete picture of current party topics but also to an
intraparty variation in how much information is presented. This
effect does not always depend on the importance or popularity of
this speciﬁc party, i.e., the ‘party logic’. It can also depend on the
‘media logic’, according to the media's perceived salience of polit-
ical issues (Hopmann et al., 2011; Mazzoleni, 1987; van Aelst et al.,
2008). In any case, the priming of issues means that information
about parties' current issue positions is not communicated to voters
equitably.
In addition, in most election campaigns, it is more likely that
leadership, rather than issues, is primed (Gidengil et al., 2002).
According to Norris et al. (1999), the priming of issues within an
election campaign only occurs if a very new issue becomes salient.
If the political debate revolves around well-known policies, the
media focus on political leaders. The question is whether thismedia
concentration on political personalities decreases voters' informa-
tion about parties' current ideological positions. Although empir-
ical studies have shown that, in neither German (Kaase, 1994;
Schoenbach, 1996) nor American elections (Hayes, 2008), ‘person-
alized’ voting occurs at the expense of ‘issue voting’, this type of
issue voting could nevertheless be based on insufﬁcient, inaccurate
or even outdated information. In other words, the personalization
of an election campaign might lead to less accurate or less updated
information about current policy positions. The less absolute hy-
pothesis made here is that:14 It is important to note here that, to differentiate later between the effects of the
change in the estimated party itself as hypothesized in H1 and H1b and the effects
of all other parties, the total of the parties' change effect in H2 does not include the
party change of the speciﬁc party, which is estimated in one party-voter dyad.
Because both variables will be integrated into the later analysis, the single party
change variable controls for this single party's part of the effect within the mean
party change variable. In other words, due to the control of the single party's effect,
an effect of H2 will be purely the result of the other parties, rather than being the
result of the voter's speciﬁc party estimation.
16 The construction of the control variables is presented in Appendix 2.
17 The term ‘eligible persons’ is more precise than ‘voters’, because not only
persons who cast a ballot are included in the analysis. In the following, when using
the term ‘voters’, I nevertheless refer to this group of ‘potential’ voters, regardless of
whether they actually make use of that right.
18 The 12-step data are available for download from the webpage of the University
of Potsdam, http://www.uni-potsdam.de/db/ls_regierungssystem_brd/index.php?
article_id¼498&clang¼0 (last checked July 1, 2015).
19 These election studies have sometimes been divided into different parts of one
country for historical reasons (East and West Germany) or because parties are
organized along an ethnic division (as in Belgium). Data from the USA, Japan and
Belgian Wallonia were excluded because they did not contain some of the impor-
tant variables in this study. Other Asian and Latin American countries' data were
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leaders and personalities), the lower voters' estimation proximity is
to current manifesto positions.
Apart from the personalization of politics, other frequent
valence issues within election campaigns are parties' speculations
about possible governmental coalitions and party performance.
These speculations might interfere with the expected negative
impact of personalistic topics in an election campaign because
discussion of possible political partners and past performance can
enhance the clarity of parties’ positional similarities and differ-
ences. Hence, a control variable will be added that accounts for
these party-politics-related topics.
3.3. Age of the political regime as a proxy for party system
institutionalization
Party systems in Eastern Europe are very unstable, as indicated
by strong party fragmentation, high rates of electoral and legislative
volatility and low party anchorage within societies (Rose and
Munro, 2009). Some of these characteristics should be interre-
lated with the hypotheses stated above about potentially stronger
party position shifts and the possibly stronger priming of political
leaders. Other characteristics, such as assumed greater party
knowledge in multiparty systems and potentially more polarized
competition in systems with greater numbers of effective parties,
will be accounted for with control variables. However, there are
speciﬁc characteristics of young party systems that might add to
voters’ confusion. These characteristics roughly all relate to party-
voter linkages, which have been found to be rather weak
(Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006). For example, frequent changes on
the party supply side in the early years after the democratic tran-
sitionwere a cause for, rather than a consequence of, high volatility
rates (Tavits, 2008). Similarly, these changes might demotivate
disappointed voters for electorally unsuccessful parties from
paying attention to elections and party campaigns. Furthermore, in
the ﬁrst years after regime change, Eastern European parties in
ofﬁce often either did not fulﬁl pre-election promises or, vice versa,
did not mention important policy changes before they were elected
(Roberts, 2010; Toka et al., 1997). Apart from the possible increase
in disappointment or distrust in party positions to which such
behaviour could lead, unexpected policies from left (or right)
parties might also have added to confusion. An example is that,
between 1989 and 2004, leftist party governments in 13 post-
communist countries decreased social spending more than
rightist party governments (Tavits and Letki, 2009).15 Hence,
although voters have general knowledge about the left-right party
heuristic (Rudi, 2010b), there are causes for distrust or confusion.
While party behaviour differences are diverse and should also be
related to differences in systems and societies within Eastern
Europe, their unifying aspect still seems to be that they are all
related to less experienced parties within less experienced systems
of parties, with loser party-voter ties and loser inter-party re-
lationships. When party systems become more stable over time in
terms of their competing actors (Rudi, 2010a), interparty compe-
tition around political issues and interparty relationships in coali-
tion building (Warwick, 1996), party-voter linkages and position
knowledge should increase as well. Because aspects of parties
within party systems are too diverse to be modelled completely in
this analysis, two control variables, which measure the party age15 They explain this phenomenon by the leftist parties' more compelling need to
demonstrate their belief in democracy and a capitalist market economy, while the
rightist parties need to demonstrate responsiveness to the electorate, which suf-
fered hardship due to the economic transition.and the age of the democracy, will serve as proxies for speciﬁc party
characteristics in young democracies.
Further control variables are those that have shown to be
important in studies of political knowledge (Gordon and Segura,
1997; Dahlberg, 2013). Following these studies, it is expected that
multiparty competition leads to clearer party competition lines and
hence to more exact voter estimations, while an even greater
number of effective political parties (ENPPs) can also lead to less
clarity due to ‘polarized pluralism’ in the party competition struc-
ture and cross-cutting of party competition lines (Sartori, 1976). In
contrast, the polarization of the party system, the party's mean left-
right divergence from all other parties weighted by their vote
shares (Dahlberg, 2013) and its afﬁliation with one of the left-right
party families should increase voters' accurate perceptions due to
enhancing clarity of left-right differences between parties. The
previous vote share of the estimated party in the previous election
is used as a proxy for its popularity, and the party's previous
participation in government, expressed by the dummy variable ‘in
government t-1’, should decrease voters' ability to estimate accu-
rately due to the expected decreases in position focus and clarity. At
the individual level, the analysis will control for both the more
objective ideological distance and the ‘felt’ affective closeness to
parties, and for sociodemographic characteristics that affect polit-
ical interest or voting behaviour, such as education status, age
(Franklin et al., 2004; Gallego, 2009; Milner, 2002) and gender
(Bennett and Bennett, 1989; Inglehart and Norris, 2000).16
4. Data sources, methodology and operationalization
The analysis combines data from eligible persons17 in 25 post-
legislative election studies from the Comparative Study of Elec-
toral Systems (CSES Modules 1 and 2, Full Releases) with the left-
right party positions of the ’12-step index’ of parties' left-right
positions (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006),18 which are based on the
raw values of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
(Klingemann et al., 2006). Using data from the CSES guarantees a
timeframe that is as close as possible to the time of the election, the
prior election campaigns and media coverage of the most impor-
tant political issues and manifesto stances. To ensure comparability
in terms of democratic institutions, the data are restricted to elec-
tion studies from Western and Eastern European democracies19
that were at that time rated ‘free’ (Freedom House, 2014).
Because changes in party positions are of particular interest as an
independent variable, the data are further restricted to parties that
were also voted into the previous legislature20. The variables are
distributed on three analytical levels with a nested data structure:
150,642 individual respondents' estimates are linked to 113excluded due to data restrictions regarding the index data used (Franzmann and
Kaiser, 2006). The full list of election studies and parties included in the analysis
can be found in Appendix 1.
20 The restriction to parliamentary parties is due to the CMP data, which mostly
covers only the manifestos of legislative parties, but it also ensures that only parties
with a chance of being known by the bulk of voters are considered.
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countries' election(s) (studies) with speciﬁc cultural and electoral
system characteristics. Due to this data structure on three levels,
the analysis employs a hierarchical linear mixed model, which
enables the breaking down of the variation in individual re-
spondents' estimates into ‘within- and between- (party and sys-
tem-) components’ (see e.g., Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). In other
words, it assesses simultaneously how strongly individual, party
and system determinants account for the variation in estimation
proximity.
4.1. The dependent variable
The dependent variable, ‘estimation proximity’, measures the
space between a voter's subjective estimation of a party's left-right
position and its position based on party manifesto data. To connect
all of the party values per country to the respective voters' esti-
mations, the data are arranged with party-voter dyads: for each
respondent, it includes as many party estimates as a respective
country's respondents' are asked about and for which data are
available in the CSES and the 12-step index database. This approach
is similar to Dahlberg's (2013) approach, but in contrast with this
and other previous research, the left-right ’12-step-index’
(Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006) is used here as the reference point
for the current left-right manifesto location. This ’12-step-index’ is
based on the ‘raw’ data of single issue saliencies in party manifestos
(Klingemann et al., 2006). The use of these manifesto data is
important for my research question because it seeks determinants
of how strongly voters' concepts of parties are linked to the current
party manifestos. Moreover, to examinewhether voters' ideological
estimates are inﬂuenced by parties' previous changes in position, I
need data containing not only the present party positions but also
the previous positions.21 Before demonstrating the operationali-
zation of the dependent variable in greater detail, I will discuss the
appropriateness of CMP data in general and, more speciﬁcally, the
use of the ‘12-step index’ more thoroughly.
4.1.1. Seeking parties’ objective left-right positions: which index is
best?
To answer the empirical question of how well a person esti-
mates a party's ideological position, it is ﬁrst necessary to ﬁnd a
valid measurement of the party's true, objective left-right location,
which is a point of scientiﬁc debate. It strongly depends on a valid
deﬁnition of what is meant by left and right. Although different
theories are referred to, and used as a base for the construction of
left-right indices, for example Marx (Budge et al., 2001) and Bobbio
(Jahn, 2011),22 it can be doubted that these theoretic sources are
valid across geographical space and time. It is well known that the
sub-dimensions of the left-right space, the economic and the non-
economic value dimensions, do not cluster everywhere in the same
manner (Kitschelt, 1995; Marks et al., 2006). In Western Europe,
most parties connect liberal market values with traditional, con-
servative ‘freedoms and rights’ values and ‘left’ economic values
with liberal ‘freedoms and rights’. However, most Eastern European21 To my knowledge, there are no survey data that contains voters' placements of
both the current and the previous left-right positions of parties. According to Meyer
(2013), even political experts' party placement questions on election surveys are
often not time-speciﬁc, either asking vaguely about ‘political parties today’ (Huber
and Inglehart, 1995) or not mentioning any time dimension (Benoit and Laver,
2007; Castles and Mair, 1984). The estimations thus reﬂect the experts' expecta-
tions about a party's position in a general sense. This lack of exactness is also
indicated by the stability of expert judgements in longitudinal comparison (Meyer,
2013: 92).
22 Also, see Franzmann (2013).parties connect those political sub-dimensions conversely
(Holl€ander, 2003; Kitschelt, 1995; Markowski, 1997; Marks et al.,
2006). Also the emphasis on each of the sub-dimensions varies
internationally (Rovny and Edwards, 2012): while, in most coun-
tries, the economic dimension is dominant, in Austria, Spain,
Poland and Slovenia, the ‘freedoms and rights’ dimension is the
more important one. It is hence useful to employ a measurement of
ideology that considers the culture-speciﬁc meaning of left and
right as much as possible.
The CMP raw data are a good starting point because they simply
represent the proportion of different political issues that a party
mentions in its manifesto, and unlike other databases, they contain
position data for a long period of time. It is hence possible to show
how positions change. The CMP was confronted with the critique
that the data might be prone to procedural errors23 (Benoit et al.,
2009). However, other left-right codes of parties’ data, such as
those compiled by experts, can also have errors, and the coding of
left-right positions is then often less transparent than the CMP
proceedings. Moreover, the CMP shows that its means for
addressing potential coding problems are sufﬁcient24 to produce
data that are at least free from systematic, over-time or cross-
national bias and that show high validity scores (Klingemann
et al., 2006, 103).
What might be of more concern than the reliability of the raw
CMP measurements is the question of how best to calculate an
index from the data. Researchers have found several methods to
accomplish this goal (Budge, 1987; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006;
Gabel and Huber, 2000; Jahn, 2011; Klingemann, 1995; Laver and
Budge, 1992). In essence, the approaches are different in terms of
how researchers sample the single issues that are important for
left-right cleavage. For most indices, researchers rely on a speciﬁc
theoretical perspective of the left-right dimension and the single
issues that belong to each side of the spectrum. Factorial analyses
are then run with a different number of left and right ‘marker’
items, with variations in how many issues are sampled (Budge,
1987; Laver and Budge, 1992; Klingemann, 1995; Gabel and
Huber, 2000).25 Most approaches arrive at an index based on the
whole country sample that they use. Only the ‘12-step approach’
(Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006) produces country-speciﬁc indices.
Brieﬂy, Franzmann and Kaiser ﬁrst distinguished between valence
and position issues by country, and they also differentiated be-
tween different time spans if the issue structure changed. Using
only those position issues for which parties within a party system
were really different from one another, they ran regression analyses
of party positions on overall party system mean issue positions.
This analysis was performed issue by issue, to determine which of
the position issues were left and which were right in comparison to
a reference party. Only then did they calculate the speciﬁc left-right
party positions by subtracting the individual party's saliency value
from the lowest saliency value of the party system (‘base value’).
The ‘raw values’ arrived at were smoothed using the means of the
raw values of three election years (the mean raw scores of the
previous election with the current election and the next election
(Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Franzmann, 2013). The choice of
single issues for the country-speciﬁc indices is hence very prag-
matically dependent on the empirically observable left-right23 Sentences in the manifestos are hand-coded into 114 single issue categories.
The relative frequency with which an issue is mentioned is deemed to indicate how
salient the party believe that the issue is (Budge and Klingemann, 2001;
Klingemann et al., 2006).
24 Potential inter-coder problems are addressed in the training of coders, as well
as during the production of the data phase (Lacewell and Werner, 2013).
25 For a more comprehensive comparison, see Dinas and Gemenis (2010).
Table 1
Mean correlations of party estimations with party manifesto indices.
Index Mean
12-step index 0.73a
RILE index 0.64a
a a ¼ .05
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This culturally sensitive approach to ideology makes it most suit-
able for my endeavours.
In the CSES data, respondents' left-right party estimates are
captured by the request to rate each party on an 11-point scale. The
‘12-step index’ and the CSES scale run from 0 (leftmost position) to
10 (rightmost position). To calculate how well respondents esti-
mate a party in comparison to the position data, I subtract the re-
spondent's left-right estimates of a party (originated in the CSES
data) from the respective party's index value (12-step data). If a
respondent's estimated values are the same for all parties, the an-
swers are recoded as missing. All non-response answers e ‘don't
know’, ‘refused’, etc. e are also coded as missing and are excluded
from analysis.26 Negative values are recoded into natural (positive)
values because I am interested in the proximity measurement and
not in whether someone estimated a party to be further to the left
or to the right of its index position. The resulting variable has a
skewed kurtosis and is thus logarithmized.27 Because the values so
far represent the difference between estimated and manifesto po-
sition values, the scale is then inverted. In the resulting variables,
higher values hence indicate greater proximity, and lower values
indicate lower proximity of the voter's estimate to the index party
position.
4.2. Independent variables
The most important independent variables relative to the hy-
potheses above are individual party change, the mean parties'
change and the priming of leaders within the election campaign. Party
change is calculated by subtracting a party's previous position from
its present position. Because only the strength of change is
important here and not its direction, negative values are recoded as
positive values. The mean parties' change is measured as the mean
of all parties' position shifts from the previous to the current
manifesto's left-right positions. The variable personalization of the
election campaign is based on a CSES variable that captures national
political experts' open answers to the question ‘[… ] what are the
ﬁve most salient factors that affected the outcome of the election
(e.g., major scandals; economic events; the presence of an inde-
pendent actor; speciﬁc issues)?’ For the construction of the vari-
able, the number of personalistic issues mentioned by the national
political expert is counted. ‘Personalistic’ issues are deﬁned here as
those issues that refer either to speciﬁc politicians without
connection to their policies or to more general mentions of lead-
ership.28 The variable represents the number of these personalistic
campaign issues out of the ﬁve possible mentions by political ex-
perts. All of these issues are considered to be ‘valence’ issues
because they do not relate to any confrontational political dimen-
sion but only to an evaluation of political personalities, which are
grounded in shared norms such as ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘being a
good leader’ in a more general sense.2926 The imputation of values for ‘don't know’ answers was not a viable alternative
to the pairwise exclusion of all missing values, because the data of most of my
sample countries only used the ‘missing’ code for this question, rather than
differentiating among ‘don't know’, ‘refused’ and ‘missing’.
27 The range of the party-voter means of the original (positive) gap values can be
found in Appendix 3.
28 For the present sample, these are ‘Personality of Jacques Chirac’ and ‘Right-
Extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen's success at the [preceding, K.B.B.] presidential elec-
tion’ (both France), ‘Resignation of the Prime Minister’ (Portugal), ‘Promises/Trust of
leadership’ (mentioned in Britain, Hungary, New Zealand, Sweden), ‘Leadership’ or
‘Personalization of the election campaign’ (mentioned in Australia, the Czech Re-
public, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland), and ‘Images of
party leaders’ (Finland).
29 For the construction of the control variables, see Appendix 2.5. Estimating parties’ ideological positions: some descriptive
statistics
As an initial overview of how voters' estimations generally ﬁt
the party index values, the mean correlations between parties and
voter estimations are shown (Table 1). For comparative reasons, the
correlation test is performed with both the 12-step index
(Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006) and the RILE index (Budge and
Klingemann, 2001). Using the values from the ‘12-step-approach’,
the correlation value is 0.73 with a 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. The
RILE index values are equally signiﬁcant, but they correlate ac-
cording to a lower value of 0.64 with the mean party estimates,
lending some support to the view that the ‘12-step-approach’
seems more appropriate30.
In general, there is evidence that party changes on the lefteright
scale lead to less precise estimations, as Fig. 1 shows.
With a greater mean party change within a country, voters'
estimation proximity to parties' left-right ideological positions is
lower. Fig. 2 graphs the bivariate relationship between parties'
mean changes per country and voters’ estimation proximity for the
younger and older democracies separately.
This ﬁgure shows that in general, the mean proximity of voter
estimations to party positions is lower in the younger democracies.
Moreover, the impact of mean party change onmisplacement is not
as strong as in the old systems, as indicated by the less steep slope
(Fig. 2).31 This ﬁrst overview of the data leaves the impression that
party and system characteristics can be important determinants of
voters' estimation proximity to party positions. To arrive at a reli-
able answer to why individual voters’ estimates are more or less
manifesto-oriented, it is, however, necessary to run a systematic
analysis that considers all levels of analysis simultaneously.6. Regression analyses
6.1. Position changes of parties on the lefteright scale and issue
domination in the election campaign as determinants of estimation
proximity
In the following, two three-level hierarchical linear models are
run, which contain the individual, party and system level impact
factors. Model 1 employs the party left-right position change on the
party level and the corresponding mean of all parties' changes on
the system level, while model 2 employs the variables for single
and mean party changes on the economic sub-dimension of left-
right ideology (Table 2). The calculation is meant as a robustness
check for model 1, but it also sheds additional light on the way in
which position changes can lead to voters' confusion about parties’
left-right positions. For means of comparison between the strength
of the coefﬁcients within the model, the ﬁrst model is also runwith30 Due to limitations of space and the word count, a more comprehensive over-
view of the proximity and the raw ‘gap’ had to be moved to the appendix; see
Appendix 3.
31 For a full list of respondents' proximity ranges within countries, see Appendix 3,
Fig. 3.
Fig. 1. Mean parties' leftright changes and estimation proximity.
Fig. 2. Mean parties' leftright changes and estimation proximity by ’young’.
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Model 1 conﬁrms Drummond's (2010) ﬁnding that respondents
who have strong emotions towards a party, as expressed by the
dummy variables ‘Like Strongly’ and ‘Don't Like’, estimate the party
less accurately than those whose emotions fall within the normal
range. The unstandardized-coefﬁcients reveal that respondents
with strong antipathy towards a party estimate it 0.17 points or
approximately 15.5 percentage points33 less accurately than32 The coefﬁcients of the one- and two-level models are not presented here
because they do not add much information to the results. They can, however, be
found in Appendix 6.
33 0.17 points here equals approximately 15.5% due to the 11 point lefteright scale.persons with no extraordinary emotions. However, the strongest
effect on estimation proximity on the individual level yields the
objective ideological distance to the party (Model 1, b-coefﬁcients).
Those respondents who place themselves farther away from the
party thus also have more difﬁculty in positioning it accurately in
this case not due to emotions but probably due only to lower levels
of electoral interest in it. This outcome and the ﬁnding of a negative
effect of ‘ideological distance’ conﬁrm Dahlberg's (2013) analysis of
‘perceptual agreement’. It is easier for voters to estimate the left-
right positions of parties to the ideologies that they objectively
share. In contrast, the exact policy positions of parties, with which
voters do not share common ideological ground, are less familiar. In
general, a respondent should be best able to estimate a party's
Fig. 3. Proximity of respondents' estimations to LeftRight positions.
Table 2
Determinants of respondents' estimation proximity to left-right party positions
Fixed part Model 1 Model 2
ß coefﬁcients (standardized) Beta coefﬁcients (unstandardized) Beta coefﬁcients (unstandardized)
Intercept 3 0.045 1.509*** 1.384***
Don't Like 0.129*** 0.167*** 0.167***
Like Strongly 0.087*** 0.099*** 0.099***
Ideological Distance 0.127*** 0.037*** 0.037***
Education* 0.056*** 0.016*** 0.016***
Age* 0.014*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Female 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
Party's Change 0.020 0.033
Party's Ecochange 0.078+
Previous Vote Share 0.050 0.002 0.004*
Party Age 0.075* 0.001* 0.001*
Left-Right Family 0.013 0.015 0.024
Party Divergence 0.090** 0.140** 0.128**
In Government t1 0.045 0.046 0.027
Issue: Party Politics 0.130*** 0.092*** 0.052+
Issue: Leader Politics 0.093** 0.069** 0.090**
Mean Party Change 0.146*** 0.544***
Mean Party Eco Change 0.345**
Party System Polar. 0.050+ 0.027+ 0.021
Multiparty System 0.093* 0.119* 0.100+
ENPP 0.113* 0.044* 0.018
Age of Democracy 0.160*** 0.003*** 0.003***
Random effects Model 1 Model 2
Variance comp. df c2 p-value Variance comp. df c2 p-value
Intercept 1, r0 0.164 79 4633.088 <0.001 0.026 79 4558.296 <0.001
Ideological Distance Slope, r2 0.028 85 1227.037 <0.001 0.001 85 1226.923 <0.001
Level 3, Intercept1/2 u00 0.021 17 23.387 0.137 0.002 17 31.658 0.017
Ideological Distance, Intercept 2, u20 0.011 24 40.378 0.019 0.000 24 40.059 0.021
Log Likelihood 887628400.000 887661700.000
N (individual/party dyads) 194351 150642
N parties 113 113
N systems 25 25
***p < .001, two sided, **p < .01, two sided, *p < .05 two-sided, +p < .05 one-sided.
Because the number of level 3 units was too small, the ﬁxed effects were calculated with non-robust standard errors. The differences in estimation of ﬁxed effects with robust
standard errors were negligible. All of the effects were ﬁxed except for ‘Ideological Distance’ on both the party and system levels. Education and Age are group mean centred.
The random effects part displayed here is calculated with the unstandardized analysis. The chi-square statistics reported above are based on only 110 of 113 level 2 units,
which had sufﬁcient data for computation. Fixed effects and variance components are based on all of the data.
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37 There are also a few parties whose positions were estimated very imprecisely,
even though the respective parties did not change their positions very strongly.
These are the Belgium FB, the Bulgarian UDF, the Canadian Reform Party, the Czech
ODS, the Finish Green League, Iceland's FSF, the Romanian PDSR, and UDMR, and
the Slovenian SD and SKD. The reasons why these parties were not estimated well
K.B. Busch / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 159e178168position if he or she occupies a close ideological position to it but is
not compromised by strong feelings. The psychological ‘assimila-
tion’ and ‘contrast’ effects are the results of overstating the simi-
larities (or differences) of a liked (or disliked) party to one's own
positions (Drummond, 2010).
All control variables on the individual level show signiﬁcant but
only moderately strong to almost negligible effects. They reveal
that better-than-average educated men estimate party positions
more accurately than others.
On the party level of analysis inmodel 1, only the party's age and
its positional divergence from other parties in the party system are
signiﬁcant. The moderately strong negative effect of party diver-
gence on the estimation indicates that, contrary to Dahlberg (2013),
parties that occupy more divergent positions than all other parties
are estimated less accurately. The reason for this ﬁnding might be
the same as for the negative effect of respondents' individual dis-
tance from the party: more divergent parties' positions might
simply be known less accurately due to fewer voters paying
attention to them.34 Additionally, older parties are estimated more
accurately. These parties might be known to more voters or might
be considered more reliable than younger ones. An increase of 10
years in age only leads to an increase of approximately one per-
centage point in estimation proximity, but moving from the
youngest to the oldest party in the sample, the difference leads to a
more than 13 percent increase.
A party's change in its left-right position does not lead to a
signiﬁcant effect on voters' estimation proximity. Hence, Hypoth-
esis 1 cannot be conﬁrmed here. In contrast, a party's change on the
economic sub-dimension is positively related to estimation prox-
imity (model 2). It increases voters' ability to estimate the party
precisely. This difference frommodel 1 could indicate that, from the
voter's perspective, the economic sub-dimension is linked more
strongly to the concept of left-right ideology, whereas the non-
economic, value-oriented sub-dimension's relationship to left-
right ideology is less clear. This assumption is also supported by a
closer examination of the individual situations in which a party's
strong shift of the left-right position is not connected to a low
estimation proximity, or party misplacement, but rather to more
precise estimations.35 In these cases mostly ‘mainstream parties’
like the German SPD, the Portuguese CDU, Iceland's Progressive
Party or the Swiss FDP are involved, i.e. electorally favoured, well-
known parties whose issue domains are connected rather
strongly to the economic left-right dimension.36 All of these parties
came in the ﬁrst four places in the parliamentary elections, in
multi-party systems. Their political stances and electoral cam-
paigns should have been mostly well observed both by the media
and the electorate. The fact that these parties' shifts on the lefte-
right scale did not produce negative effects in terms of voters' left-34 In an earlier version of the analysis, in which the divergence variable was not
included, the previous vote share showed a negative effect, which was signiﬁcant at
level p < .001.
35 The mean party shift to the left or right equals 0.34 and the standard deviation
from this is 0.27. If a shift to the left or right equals or exceeds this mean plus one
standard deviation, i.e. the value equals or is bigger than 0.61, I call this a ‘strong
shift’. The mean estimation proximity equals 1.39 and the standard deviation isv.5.
If the estimation proximity is lower than 1.39 minus half of the standard deviation,
i.e. lower than 1.14, I call this a ‘low estimation proximity’ or ‘bad estimation’. Also
see Appendix 5 with the full list of parties' left-right change values, mean party
proximity values and the qualitative evaluation of these, based on the above
mentioned thresholds for strong shifts and low proximity values.
36 Other parties which shifted quite strongly were estimated with about mean
precision or only a bit less precise; (within the range of up to the mean plus or
minus a half standard deviation). These are Australia's LP, Belgium's CVP, the French
UDF, and RPR, Great Britain's Conservatives, Hungary's MSzP, Fidesz-MPP and FKgP,
and the Swiss SVP.right estimations, but rather the opposite, might mean that in these
cases, left-right shifting on the economic sub-dimension even drew
voters' attentions to the respective political positions, probably due
to the parties' popularity, their usual strength on the (economic)
left-right issue domain and the saliency of the left-right cleavage in
the respective party systems.37 The point to take away, here, is that
the effect of party position shifts on voters' estimation precision can
really be either positive or negative, most probably depending on
the voters' general acknowledgement of the speciﬁc party's (eco-
nomic) issue domination. Position shifts leading to more precise
estimations should be rather the exception e and seems to be
strongly dependent on the party which shifts.
Turning to the system level determinants of the analysis, the
variable for themean total system change is negatively connected to
estimation proximity, conﬁrming Hypothesis 2. It is signiﬁcant in
both models 1 and 2, although the mean parties' total change effect
in model 2 is slightly less pronounced than that of mean total
change on the lefteright scale in model 1. The stronger the mean
change is of parties on the left-right axis (model 1) or on the eco-
nomic sub-dimension of the lefteright scale (model 2), the less
accurate the respondents' estimations are, or at least the less
closely oriented to the manifesto positions they are. While a single
party's change does not necessarily lead to confusion of left-right
positions or even increase voters' estimation proximity (as in
model 2), a system of at least two or more parties' changes adding
up seem to be problematic for the voters' estimation capacity.38 In
all countries, in which the mean of all parties' position shifts are
strong, the reasonwas medium to strong party positions shifts of at
least two or more parties.39 The analysis conﬁrms the hypothesis
that in at least some cases, the overall turmoil of party positions
within party systems can lead to less precise estimations even of
parties which do not shift strongly.
Comparing models 1 and 2, the other variables on the system
level all show the same direction of inﬂuence, although the co-
efﬁcients' strength and levels of signiﬁcance change to some extent.
The variable ‘age of democracy’ controls for possible systematic bias
due to the lower level experience of most parties and voters in the
younger party systems. Adding to the party age impact, it conﬁrms
that, apart from the age of the speciﬁc party, the age of the system
inwhich it operates is also important. Where party systems are less
institutionalized, as indicated by ever changing coalitions, weakerseem to be more dispersed than in the aformentioned group. Lower levels of
popularity and/or non-left-right issue dominated stances might be reasons for less
precise estimations for some of them, like the Canadian Reform Party, the Finish
Green League, and the Hungarian UDMR. Another reason might be a previous
membership in an electoral alliances and/or previous governmental coalitions (the
Slovenian Parties, the Finish Green League). More research into individual party
characteristics and behaviour would be needed here, to fully explain the voters'
misplacements of these parties in a more differentiated way.
38 It should be remembered here that the total party system change is calculated
as the sum of all parties' changes within the system. The speciﬁcally estimated
single party's change is, however, controlled for with the party change variable,
because the dependent variable expresses the estimation proximity for speciﬁc
party-voter dyads on the individual level and not a mean for each voter. A one-party
change can hence not be the cause of the effect of total party change decreasing
estimation proximity, but it must be a pattern of at least two or more parties
changing, leading to voter confusion.
39 See Appendix 5. ‘Strong’ means that the mean of all party position shifts within
a country equalled or was stronger than the mean plus half of the standard devi-
ation (>¼0.4). The exception for this accumulation of at least two parties' position
shifts leading to strong mean values is Iceland, where only the Progressive Party
shifted strongly.
Table 3
Respondents' estimation proximity to left-right party positions with position
changes on the economic sub-dimension and interaction effects of young party
systems * changes
Fixed part Model 3
Beta coefﬁcients, (unstandardized)
Intercept 3 1.549***
Don't Like 0.167***
Like Strongly 0.099***
Ideological Distance 0.037***
Education* 0.016***
Age* 0.000***
Female 0.037***
Party's Ecochange 0.073+
Previous Vote Share 0.003*
Party Age 0.001*
Left-Right Family 0.018
Party Divergence 0.107*
In Government t1 0.021
Issue: Party Politics 0.038
Issue: Leader Politics 0.079*
Overall/Total Eco Change 0.459**
Multiparty System 0.064
ENPP 0.000
Age of Democracy 0.002
Young 0.230+
Young*Overall Eco Change 0.357+
Random effects Variance comp. Df c2 p-value
Intercept 1, r0 0.026 79 4575.933 <0.001
Ideological Distance Slope, r2 0.00 85 1226.915 <0.001
Level 3, Intercept1/2 u00 0.001 16 27.115 0.040
Ideological Distance, Intercept 2, u20 0.011 24 40.171 0.020
Log Likelihood 88764960000.00
N (individual/party dyads) 194351
N parties 113
N systems 25
***p < .001, two sided, **p < .01, two sided, *p < .05 two-sided, +p < .05 one-sided.
Because the number of level 3 units was too small, the ﬁxed effects were calculated
with non-robust standard errors. The differences in estimation of ﬁxed effects with
robust standard errors were negligible. All of the effects were ﬁxed except for
‘Ideological Distance’ on both the party and system levels. Education and Age are
group mean centred. The random effects part displayed here is calculated with the
unstandardized analysis. The chi-square statistics reported above are based on only
110 of 113 level 2 units, which had sufﬁcient data for computation. Fixed effects and
variance components are based on all of the data.
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are more obscure or might in general even seem arbitrary and
interchangeable to voters. Lower levels of attention or more
disbelief in party promises and political disenchantment could be
causes for less accurate party position estimating in the younger
party systems. In that vein, the effect for age of democracy is rather
connected to the institutionalization of party positional domination
or issue saliency over time. The older the democratic regime is, and
the more clear-cut and repeated the positions are, the more voters
pay attention to them and acknowledge them.
Similarly, both the debate about possible governmental co-
alitions and the priming of political leaders seem to increase
attention to the left-right positions of the manifestos. On the one
hand, this outcome is surprising because the priming of personal-
ities means that there are fewer left-right issues that are highly
salient before the election. On the other hand, the ﬁnding ﬁts well
with the earlier cited studies, which showed that personalized
voting does not decrease issue voting (Kaase, 1994; Schoenbach,
1996; Hayes, 2008). The analysis here even shows that leader
politics can increase correct ideological placing e likely due to an
increased level of attention. If political leadership is primed by the
media during election campaigns, increased attention to these is
not automatically bad for peoples' awareness of political issues. It is
not a zero-sum game. This result can be at least deduced from the
analyses here, which control for position change or the parties'
change on the economic sub-dimension. In other words, when
nothing particularly interesting occurs on the side of parties' left-
right positions, and the media then concentrates on leader char-
acteristics, this focus cannot harm existing political (position)
knowledge. In contrast, the public's attention might be raised, and
knowledge about positions is refreshed.
Turning to the control variables on the system level, in model 1,
they are all signiﬁcant and in the expected directions. Both models
show that, in multiparty systems, voters estimate parties more
precisely e probably due to the enhanced ‘incentive structure’
(Gordon and Segura, 1997) to inform oneself if more parties have a
chance of entering government. The difference between party
systems of less to more than 2.5 parties is a 10 percentage point
increase for the larger systems, as the Beta coefﬁcients (model 1),
divided by 0.11 indicate. However, an increase in the number of
parliamentary parties beyond that multiparty threshold is either
negatively connected to estimation proximity, as was expected, or
is not signiﬁcant (model 2). Drummond's (2010) hypothesis that, in
multiparty systems, a greater number of parties reduces partisan
error due to more ‘crowding’ on the lefteright scale is thus too
simplistic because it neglects the nonlinearity of the effect: within
multiparty systems, if more parties enter a race, the voters' esti-
mation proximity rather decreases again. The reason for this
outcome might be the greater probability of ideological division
lines cross-cutting each other and thereby leading to a situation of a
‘polarized pluralistic’ competition structure (Sartori, 1976) e or
even the overload of information, leading voters to lower cognition
of single ideological positions. Although the number of parties and
the multiparty dummy variable yield quite strong effects, in model
1, ‘Polarization of the party system’ still has a small but one-sided
impact on estimation proximity to the manifesto values; in model
2, the effect is no longer signiﬁcant. Ideological Distance, the dif-
ference between a respondent's self-position estimation and that of
a party, has a varying inﬂuence on voters' estimation proximity,
both on the party level and on the system level. The strength of the
effect on estimation proximity thus depends slightly on the party
and also on the country. In some party or country contexts, voters'
ideological distance from the parties has a greater effect on esti-
mation proximity than in other contexts. However, the variation is
only very small, as the variance components in Table 2 show. In thenext section, the question of why single party change does not lead
to confusion but rather increases voters' estimation accuracy is
addressed again. This third analytical model will advance on dif-
ferences between more and less consolidated democracies.
6.2. Party change on the economic scale in established and less
established party systems
Building on the ﬁnding that change in the economic left-right
sub-dimension is related differently to voters' estimation posi-
tions depending on the age of the democratic system (Fig. 2), a third
model of analysis is run, which differentiates between the older,
well-institutionalized party systems and the younger, less experi-
enced ones (Table 3). With all else being equal as in model 2, it
advances with a dummy variable ‘young’ for differentiating be-
tween young and old party systems and an interaction variable of
‘young’ times the mean position change on the economic sub-
dimension, to determine whether change really has a different ef-
fect in the younger systems.
As it turns out, voters' position estimations are signiﬁcantly
worse in the younger party systems. The direction of inﬂuence of
the two change variables is the same as in model 2: a single party's
change in economic position leads to a slight increase in voter
K.B. Busch / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 159e178170estimations, while the aggregate change of party positions on that
same economic scale leads to voter confusion. The interaction effect
of ‘young democracy’ * Overall (mean) Eco change is, however,
positive, indicating that, in the young systems, the negative effect of
mean change on position estimations is much less pronounced
than in the older Western democracies. This moderating effect is
only found in the model with the change in economic sub-
dimension variables. It is not signiﬁcant in a model that adds the
same type of interaction term to the model with the overall left-
right change variables.40 The effect of parties' mean change in
left-right positions thus depends on the question of the types of
issues that change. If only the mean change on the economic sub-
dimension is tested for, this does not confuse voters in Eastern
Europe as much as it does in the older, more established party
systems. In contrast, if the full left-right position change is
considered additionally, which also consists of the non-economic
values dimension, it is in general even more difﬁcult for voters to
estimate party positions accurately. This difﬁculty provides an
important insight into the understanding of how the left and right
sub-dimensions e the economic and the non-economic values'
dimensions e are understood to constitute left-right ideology. To
build on Neuman's terminology, to Eastern Europeans, the con-
ceptual integration of the non-economic values' dimension into the
ideology paradigm is less clear than the economic values'
dimension.
It is interesting that, in situations in which parties are still very
much in the process of institutionalization, movements of parties
on the economic dimension do not decrease position estimation
proximity as strongly as in Western societies. Perhaps in the West,
parties' positions are expected to be rather ﬁxed, and voters rely
more on their long-term experience. It should also be considered
that, in the older systems, the level of party position estimation is
better to begin with than in most of the young democracies. The
percentage of voters who pay attention to politics is limited or
perhaps even almost saturated in the older democracies. If two or
more parties deviate fromwhat voters are used to, estimations then
can only worsen. In Eastern Europe, inwhich the overall estimation
of positions is less precise, change still provides the opportunity for
parties to differentiate themselves more and to set the demarcation
line clearer than before. Voters who do attend to politics are then
enabled to differentiate the parties better. In summary, the effects
of parties' position changes on voters’ estimations are not very clear
cut. There are differences between established party systems and
those in institutionalization stages.
7. Discussion and conclusions
The piece of research has analysed several determinants of
voters' perception proximity to parties' left-right positions. From
the three-level- analyses, it can be concluded that individual, party,
and system level characteristics make a difference in voters' per-
ceptions. One of the most important ﬁndings is that much of voters’
confusion of party positions is due to the strength of multiple
parties changing their left-right positions. To some part, stronger
aggregate party position shifts between elections can explain less
exact knowledge of party positions in the young, less institution-
alized party systems in Eastern Europe.
The individual voter's objective estimation is mostly increased if
he or she shares a close political position with the party, but it is
strongly harmed by extreme emotional involvement. Voters should
not like parties too strongly if they want a realistic view of a party's40 Due to space restrictions, a table is not displayed here with this model. It can be
found in Appendix 6.left-right position. Rose-coloured glasses seem to blur the percep-
tion of issues that do not ﬁt the beloved picture. Similarly, it does
not help if voters do not like a party at all. These psychological ef-
fects of both positive and negative affection on estimation prox-
imity, as found in earlier studies of political sophistication
(Drummond, 2010), are thus conﬁrmed.
On the party level, it was shown that older parties are known
better, but parties that take more divergent positions on the lefte-
right scale are estimated less accurately. Why this party divergence
effect does not point in the same direction as in previous research
(Dahlberg, 2013) remains unclear. It was assumed that voters do not
observe the more divergent parties' positions as well as the more
‘mainstream’ ones. This assumption also ﬁtted to the observation
that in cases in which voters estimated parties precisely despite
comparatively strong position shifts, only popular parties who are
dominant on the left-right economic subdimension were involved.
System and aggregate characteristics are very important de-
terminants of how well voters perceive parties' left-right positions.
There are two reasons for this fact: if voters want to make informed
voting decisions, the precise differentiation between parties might
be more necessary and useful under speciﬁc conditions, such as the
multiparty setting. This ﬁnding conﬁrms Gordon and Segura's
(1997) view that voters seem to adapt to the party system
context. Furthermore, the estimation of parties is easier if the party
positions are more polarized and if the party competition is clearer
due to there being fewer effective parliamentary parties.
The new ﬁndings of this study conﬁrm the inﬂuence of party
behaviour and issue priming within election campaigns. An indi-
vidual party's position change does not necessarily lead to less
estimation proximity to its current ideological position, and change
on the economic sub-dimension can lead to even more precise
estimations. The reasons for this effect not being very strong and
pointing in a different direction should be multifold: It was
assumed that the party popularity, the issue domain of the party,
and the number of changes which happen simultaneously within
the party system should be relevant. Voters' awareness of single
party shifts seems to be higher for the more popular parties with
traditionally strong economic issue domination.
Contrary to the ﬁnding that these single parties' left-right shifts
on the economic sub-dimension could even enhance estimation
precision, aggregated major change in left-right positions did
confuse voters. It had a strong negative effect on voters' percep-
tions. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that of Adams and colleagues' (aggre-
gate data) analyses (2011, 2014), that voters often do not perceive
change. If only the change on the economic sub-dimension is
considered, it is, however, necessary to also differentiate between
the older and younger democratic systems. In the younger party
systems, position change on the economic sub-dimension does not
decrease voter estimation proximity as strongly as in the older
systems, likely due to the mostly, but not always, rightful expec-
tation of voters in the West that the positions are rather ﬁxed.
Change on the overall left-right position, however, does not affect
voters in the younger systems signiﬁcantly differently than in the
older systems. It was concluded that for voters in the younger de-
mocracies of Eastern Europe it is comparatively easier to see how
the economic sub-dimension is related to the concept of left-right:
When they are asked to place parties on the left-right dimension,
they seem to refer stronger to this sub-dimension than to the non-
economic one. More in-depth research into data covering a longer
time-span would be needed to conﬁrm these interpretations. How
individual voters integrate speciﬁc single political issues into their
understanding of parties’ left-right ideologies might also require
more in-depth analyses of qualitative data.
Contrary to expectations was the present ﬁnding that parties are
estimatedmore closely to their issue positions if a leadership issue is
K.B. Busch / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 159e178 171primed before the election. This insight adds to the research on
‘issue voting’, which has shown that personalized election cam-
paigns do not result in less ’issue voting’ (Kaase, 1994; Schoenbach,
1996; Hayes, 2008). Voters know parties' positions even if the media
concentrate more on political leaders and on other valence issues. It
is not a zero-sum game that decreases voters' knowledge about
current party ideology. In light of the other effects in the analytical
model, which considers change on the left-right axis and ﬁndings
about issue priming (Norris et al., 1999), this result can be inter-
preted in such a fashion that, if not much change on left-right issues
occurs, and the media concentrate on political personalities, voters
keep left-right positions in mind. Their knowledge about left-right
positions is even advanced, likely due to an overall greater level of
attention if leadership is in question. To obtain a deeper under-
standing and to validate this possible causal chain, more research
into the inﬂuences of party behaviour and communication is needed.
The present analysis started with some strong claims. Political
theory, following Downs (1957), expects voters to know party po-
sitions at least roughly to make the best suited voting decisions.
While this expectation is very plausible, it is also a strong gener-
alization and a normative claim. A great part of the responsibility is
in the hands of the parties who need to take care of strategic po-
sition taking which advances on their political scope. Further, it is
not yet clear how voters who know party positions less precisely
truly behave in the voting booth. More determinants than issue
voting cues should be considered. While this paper investigated
position knowledge, it remains for future analyses to examine in
greater detail howmore or less knowledge affects voting behaviour
and how factors other than issue vote cues leads voters to different
e or even similar e voting decisions.
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Appendix 1. List of election studies and parties which are
integrated into the analyses
Australia 1996: ALP Australian Labour Party, LPA Liberal Party of
Australia, The National Party of Australia41
Belgium Flanders 1999: Agalev (Green), CVP Christian People's
Party, SP Socialist Party, VB Flemish Bloc, VLD Flemish Liberals.
Bulgaria 2001: DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom, ODS
United Democratic Forces.
Canada 1997: BQ Quebecan Bloc, LP Liberal Party of Canada, NDP
New Democratic Party, PC Progressive Conservative Party of Can-
ada, R Reform Party.
Czech Republic 1996: Association for the Republic, CSSD Czech
Social Democratic Party, ODA Civic Democratic Alliance, ODS Civic
Democratic Party, KDU-CSL Christian Democratic Union.
Denmark 1998: CD Centre Democrats, KF Conservative People's
Party, SD Social Democratic Party, SF Socialist People's Party, V
Liberals.
Finland 2003: Green League, KESK Centre Party, KD Christian
Democrats, KOK National Coalition Party, Left Alliance, SDP Finnish41 For these parties some of the variables were not available, but due to their
importance in their respective party systems, and the hypothesized effect of party
shifts on voter estimations, their left-right shifts went into the mean calculation of
party shifts.Social Democratic Party, SFP/RKP Swedish People's Party of Finland.
France 2002: FN National Front, LV Greens, PCF Communists, PS
Socialist Party, RPR/UMP Rally for the Republic, UDF Union for
French Democracy.
Germany West 1998: Alliance '90/Greens, FDP Free Democratic
Party, PDS Party of Democratic Socialism, SPD Social Democratic
Party.
Germany East 1998: Alliance '90/Greens, FDP Free Democratic
Party, PDS Party of Democratic Socialism, SPD Social Democratic
Party.
Great Britain42 1997: Conservative Party, Labour Party, LDP
Liberal Democrats, SNP Scottish National Party43
Hungary 1998: FIDESZ-MPP Alliance of Young Democrats e
Hungarian Civic Party, FKgP Independent Smallholders’ Party, MSzP
Hungarian Socialist Party, SzDSz Alliance of Free Democrats.
Iceland 1999: FSF Progressive Party, Sj Independence Party.
Ireland 2002: Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Green Party, LP Labour
Party, PD Progressive Democrats, Sinn Fein41
Israel 1996: Ha'avoda (Labour), Likud, Mafdal, Meretz, Shas.
Netherlands 1998: CDA Christian Democratic Appeal, D066
Democrats 66, GL Green Left, PvdA Labour Party, SP Socialist Party,
VVD People's Party for Freedom and Democracy.
New Zealand 1996: LP Labour Party, Alliance, NP National Party,
NZFP New Zealand First Party.
Norway 1997: DNA Labour Party, FrP Progress Party, H Conser-
vative Party, KrF Christian Democratic Party, SP Centre Party, SV
Socialist Left Party.
Poland 1997: PSL Polish People's Party, SLD Democratic Left
Alliance, UP Union of Labour.
Portugal 2002: CDU Uniﬁed Democratic Coalition, PP Popular
Party, PS Socialist Party, PSD Social Democratic Party.
Romania 1996: PDSR Party of Social Democracy in Romania,
PUNR Party of Romanian National Unity, UDMR Hungarian Demo-
cratic Alliance.
Slovenia 1996: LDS Liberal Democracy, SD Social Democratic
Party, SKD Slovene Christian Democrats, SLS People's Party.
Spain 1996: Convergence and Unity CiU, EAJ-PNV Basque
Nationalist Party, PP Popular Party, PSOE SocialistWorkers' Party, IU
United Left.
Sweden 1998: CP Centre Party, FP Liberal People's Party, KD
Christian Democrats, MS Moderate Coalition Party (The Alliance
Manifest), VP Left Party, SAP Social Democratic Labour Party.
Switzerland 1999: CVP/PDC Christian Democrats, FDP/PLR
Freethinking Democrats, GLP/PVL Green Party, SPS/PSS Social
Democrats, SVP/UDC Swiss People's Party.
Appendix 2. Operationalization of the control variables
Note that if no other source is mentioned, the below variables
origin from or are based on CSES data.
Appendix 3. The distribution of voters' proximities to parties
within countries and summary statistics for the original
variable “Estimation gaps” between parties and manifesto
positions
Legend: The boxplot shows the distribution of voters' proxim-
ities to parties within countries.44 Denmark, Sweden and the42 Great Britain without Northern Ireland.
43 Only Scottish respondents evaluated the Scottish National Party.
44 A table with the mean and the minimum to maximum mean ranges of the
original ‘gaps’ between persons' estimations and party positions can be found
below.
“Don't Like”, Like
Strongly”:
two dummy variables which are coded ‘one’ if the respondent has a strong positive (negative) affection towards the party. The variable, from
which the dummies are calculated, is an 11-point metric scale question. It ranges from zero for ‘strongly disliking’ to ten for ‘strongly liking’ the
party. Respondents were asked to place every one of the ﬁve most important parties from the current election on the scale. An extraordinary
negative (positive) affection is represented by values of ‘x’ which are below (above) the range of the country speciﬁc mean minus (plus) one
(country speciﬁc) standard deviation
“Education”: measured with an eight-point scale from “no schooling” to “university undergraduate degree completed” (CSES)
“Age”: a metric variable from 18 (eligibility age) onwards
“Female”: A dummy variable coded one if the person is female
“Previous Vote share”: The party's vote share in the last election
“Party Age”: a metric variable representing the age of the party in the current year of election.
“Left-Right Family”: a dummy variable which builds on the information of party families in the CSES. It is coded one if the party's party-family is one of the core left-
right ones.
“Exgovernmental”: a dummy variable which is coded one if the party was in the current election's preceding government. The information on this was collected from
parline.
“Issue: Party Politics”: represents the number of party politics issues within the ﬁve most important salient issues of the election campaign, mentioned by national
political experts (CSES data). These concern either pre-election discussions about ‘Party Alliances, Dynamics, Re-Alignment’ (Belgium Flanders,
Czech Rep., Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland) or valence issues such as the evaluation of ‘Party Performance’
(Australia, Belgium Flanders, Canada, Germany, Great Britain), or ‘Party Scandals’ (e.g. Norway)
“Party System
Polarization”:
measures were taken from Dalton (2008). For Flanders I calculated the value, using Dalton's formula.
“Multiparty System”: a dummy variable coded one if there are more than 2.5 parties within the party system.
“ENPP”: the effective number of parliamentary parties, as calculated by Gallagher (2013)
“Age of Democracy”: the origin of this is a variable called “system tenure” in the “Political Institutions dataset (Beck et al., 2001). It represents the age of the current
political regime.
“young”: a dummy variable with the value one, if the party system is one of the young Eastern European ones of the sample. East Germany is coded as zero,
here, since the party system was inherited to a large part from the West
K.B. Busch / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 159e178172Netherlands are the countries with the highest median proximitye
voters tend to estimate parties more accurately than in other
countries. All of these are Western European countries with a long
democratic history and the Netherlands can be even seen as a
prototype of a ‘consociational democracy’, characterized by very
proportional elections and strong party ties with civil society
(Lijphart, 1999). Poland sticks out with the lowest median voters'
estimation proximity, followed by Romania, Slovenia, Hungary and
Iceland. Apparently, four of these countries are young communist
successor countries, which in the early years after their regime
changes had particularly volatile party systems (Rudi, 2010a) and a
strong “non-economic or cultural, new-politics dimension” (Evans
and Whiteﬁeld, 1993: 157). The way how strongly respondents
also think of these issues when they have to place parties on the
lefteright scale might vary. The outstandingly poor Polish medianElection study Party with min and max difference (between voters' estimati
Australia 1996 ALP Labour Party
NPA National Party
Belgium Flanders 1999 VLD Flemish Liberals
VB Flemish Bloc
Bulgaria 2001 DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom
ODS United Democratic Party
Canada 1997 LP Liberal Party of Canada
Reform Party
Czech Republic KDU-CSL Christian Democratic Union
ODS: Civic Democratic Party
Denmark 1998 SF Socialist People's Party
Centre Democrats (CD)
Finland 2003 The Left Alliance
The Greens of Finland
France 2002 Union for French Democracy
FN National Front
Germany 1998 FDP Free Democratic Party
PDS Left Party
Germany East 1998 FDP Free Democratic Party
Alliance '90/Greensproximity seems to be mostly due to the very big estimation gap of
voters' estimations of the Polish Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a
communist successor party. In that case the party's left-right po-
sition might have been speciﬁcally hard to estimate. Also in Iceland
in 1999, the low median proximity of voters' estimations to party
positions is mainly due to voters' misplacements of one party, the
Progressive party. A possible reason might be that voters missed
the centrist Progressive Party's position change to the left because
of other, more spectacular position takings on the left and right
taking place at the same time, due to the formation of a new right
and a new left party, the ‘Liberal Party’, and the ‘Left-greens’ and a
new party union, the ‘Left Alliance’ (see Hardarson and Kristinsson,
2001).
Mean estimation gaps per country, and minimum þ maximum
mean gaps of parties within countries.ons and party position) Country ranges s.e. Mean of all parties per country
1.92 (Min value) 0.11 2.06
2.17 (Max value)
1.91 (Min value) 0.58 2.29
3.43 (Max value)
1.55 (Min value) 0.88 2.43
3.31 (Max value)
1.66 (Min value) 0.86 2.48
3.64 (Max value)
1.57 (Min value) 0.67 2.33
3.27 (Max value)
1.68 (Min value) 0.29 2.13
2.13 (Max value)
1.38 (Min value) 0.45 2.23
2.99 (Max value)
1.69 (Min value) 0.33 1.99
2.63 (Max value)
1.53 (Min value) 0.43 1.81
2.56 (Max value)
1.52 (Min value) 0.12 1.65
1.79 (Max value)
(continued )
Election study Party with min and max difference (between voters' estimations and party position) Country ranges s.e. Mean of all parties per country
Great Britain 1997 LDP Liberal Democrats 1.23 (Min value) 0.40 1.89
Conservative Party 2.33 (Max value)
Hungary 1998 FIDESZ MPP: Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party 1.82 (Min value) 0.43 2.46
MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party 3.00 (Max value)
Iceland 1999 F Progressive Party 1.56 (Min value) 0.84 2.42
Sj Independence Party 3.27 (Max value)
Ireland 2002 LP Labour Party 1.54 (Min value) 0.42 2.05
Fianna Fail 2.54 (Max value)
Israel 1996 LIKUD 1.49 (Min value) 0.41 2.05
AVODA (Labour) 2.65 (Max value)
Netherlands 1998 GL Green Left 1.18 (Min value) 0.13 1.39
VVD People's Party for Freedom and Democracy 1.55 (Max value)
New Zealand 1996 NZFP New Zealand First 1.44 (Min value) 0.20 1.67
NP National Party 2.00 (Max value)
Norway 1997 SV Socialist Left Party 1.12 (Min value) 0.37 1.54
DNA Labour Party 2.21 (Max value)
Poland 1997 UP Union of Labour 2.09 (Min value) 0.82 3.25
SLD Democratic Left Alliance 3.88 (Max value)
Portugal 2002 PS Socialist Party 1.21 (Min value) 0.45 1.68
PP Popular Party 2.42 (Max value)
Romania 1996 Party of National Unity 2.71 (Min value) 0.11 2.82
UDMR Hungarian Democratic Party 2.97 (Max value)
Slovenia 1996 LDS Liberal Democracy 2.18 (Min value) 0.53 2.7
Christian Democrats 3.52 (Max value)
Spain 1996 Convergence and Unity 1.60 (Min value) 0.30 2.01
PSOE Socialist Worker 2.99 (Max value)
Sweden 1998 CP Centre Party 0.92 (Min value) 0.33 1.44
KdS Christian Democratic Party 2.03 (Max value)
Switzerland 1999 CVP-PDC Christian Democrats 1.26 (Min value) 0.24 1.6
Swiss People's Party 1.97 (Max value)
All Parties Minimum:
Mean:
Maximum:
0.92 (Min value)
3.88 (Max value)
0.34
0.63
1.52
2.00
2.58
K.B. Busch / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 159e178 173Appendix 4. Variable summary statisticsVariable N Mean SD Min Max
Estimation proximity 150642 1.39 0.51 0.00 2.34
Don't like 194351 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Like strongly 194351 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Ideological distance 165183 2.29 1.74 0.00 9.42
Education 192324 4.89 1.72 1.00 8.00
Age 193651 46.07 16.84 18.00 101.00
Female 194208 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Party's change 113 0.33 0.27 0.00 1.32
Party's ecochange 113 0.40 0.39 0.01 2.40
Previous vote share 113 16.26 12.68 0.00 52.24
Party age 113 49.04 42.26 3.00 156.00
Left-right family 113 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00
Party divergence 113 0.82 0.33 0.21 1.83
In Government t-1 113 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Age of Democracy 25 47.20 26.73 4.00 73.00
Party system polar. 25 3.40 1.03 1.83 5.44
Overall/total PS change 25 0.35 0.16 0.14 0.76
Overall/total eco change 25 0.40 0.19 0.05 0.78
Young 25 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
ENPP 25 3.81 1.23 2.16 6.61
Issue: party politics 25 0.80 0.65 0.00 2.00
Multiparty system 25 0.80 0.41 0.00 1.00
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Voters' Mean Proximity valuesCountry Party LR-Shift Prox. Evaluation Mean LR-
Shifts
Mean:
0.34;
Std:
0.27
Mean:
1.39;
Std: 0.5
Strong Shift (>¼0.61) e
around average/good
estimation (Proximity
>¼1.14)
Low to Medium Shift,
(<0.61), bad estimation
(Proximity <1.14)
Rather strong to strong
shift (>¼0.61) bad
estimation (Proximity
<1.14)
Low to medium shift
(<0.61), average to good
estimation
(Proximity>¼1.14)
Mean of
parties' LR-
Shifts: 0.34
Australia
(1996)
LPA 0.66 1.40 X 0.58
ALP 0.50 1.32 X
NPA 0.59 1.48 X
Belgium
Flanders
(1999)
VLD 0.39 1.40 X 0.51
CVP 1.00 1.32 X
SP 0.23 1.37 X
VB 0.49 0.93 X
Agalev 0.44 1.34 X
Bulgaria
(2001)
ODS 0.06 0.95 X 0.17
DPS 0.27 1.5 X
Canada
(1997)
LP 0.31 1.48 X 0.35
R 0.02 1.06 X
PC 0.43 1.38 X
BQ 0.69 0.98 X
Czech
Republic
(1996)
ODS 0.01 0.94 x 0.28
CSSD 0.27 1.45 X
KDU-CSL 0.07 1.5 X
Association
for the Rep.
1.01 1.08 X
ODA 0.05 1.26 X
Denmark
(1998)
SD 0.60 1.39 X 0.33
V 0.05 1.57 X
KF 0.44 1.55 X
SF 0.37 1.62 X
CD 0.21 1.33 X
Finland
(2003)
KESK 0.47 1.23 X 0.34
SDP 0.43 1.37 X
KOK 0.53 1.22 X
Left Alliance 0.07 1.59 X
Green
League
0.09 1.04 X
KD 0.59 1.32 X
SFP/RKP 0.22 1.24 X
France
(2002)
RPR/UMP 0.87 1.29 X 0.39
FN 0.14 1.18 X
PS 0.10 1.40 X
UDF 0.79 1.47 X
LV 0.08 1.33 X
PCF 0.37 1.42 X
Germany
East
(1998)
SPD 0.81 1.52 X 0.29
Alliance/
Greens
0.05 1.45 X
FDP 0.24 1.53 X
PDS 0.06 1.45 X
Germany
West
(1998)
SPD 0.81 1.54 X 0.29
Alliance/
Greens
0.05 1.51 X
FDP 0.24 1.52 X
PDS 0.06 1.24 X
Great Britain
(1997)
Labour 0.56 1.35 X 0.47
Conservative 1.07 1.24 X
LDP 0.20 1.63 X
SNP 0.02 1.41 X
Hungary
(1998)
MSzP 0.69 1.23 X 0.68
FIDESZ-MPP 0.68 1.30 X
FKgP 0.67 1.15 X
SzDSz 0.67 1.06 X
Iceland
(1999)
SJ 0.19 0.96 X 0.76
FSF 1.32 1.49 X
Ireland
(2002)
Fianna Fail 0.11 1.46 X 0.21
Fine Gael 0.46 1.47 X
Labour 0.10 1.53 X
Sinn Fein 0.13 1.46 X
(continued )
Country Party LR-Shift Prox. Evaluation Mean LR-
Shifts
Mean:
0.34;
Std:
0.27
Mean:
1.39;
Std: 0.5
Strong Shift (>¼0.61) e
around average/good
estimation (Proximity
>¼1.14)
Low to Medium Shift,
(<0.61), bad estimation
(Proximity <1.14)
Rather strong to strong
shift (>¼0.61) bad
estimation (Proximity
<1.14)
Low to medium shift
(<0.61), average to good
estimation
(Proximity>¼1.14)
Mean of
parties' LR-
Shifts: 0.34
Green 0.24 1.25 X
Israel (1999) Ha'avoda 0.44 1.16 X 0.14
Likud 0.08 1.55 X
Shas 0.0 1.29 X
Mafdal 0.18 1.45 X
Meretz 0.00 1.24 X
Netherlands
(1998)
PvdA 0.14 1.58 X 0.25
VVD 0.18 1.48 X
CDA 0.09 1.62 X
D‘ 66 0.29 1.54 X
GL 0.59 1.71 X
SP 0.18 1.52 X
New
Zealand
(1996)
NP 0.46 1.35 X 0.31
LP 0.16 1.49 X
NZFP 0.17 1.57 X
Alliance 0.46 1.48 X
Norway
(1997)
DNA 0.19 1.31 X 0.31
FrP 0.05 1.52 X
H 0.56 1.53 X
KrF 0.35 1.62 X
SP 0.35 1.58 X
SV 0.32 1.66 X
Poland
(1997)
SLD 0.54 1.64 X 0.55
PSL 0.69 0.87 X
UP 0.42 1.35
Portugal
(2002)
PSD 0.03 1.50 X 0.40
PS 0.57 1.70 X
PP 0.11 1.21 X
CDU 0.87 1.50 X
Romania
(1996)
PDSR 0.45 1.12 X 0.18
UDMR 0.04 1.08 X
PUNR 0.14 1.15 X
Spain (1996) PP 0.29 1.38 X 0.22
PSOE 0.15 1.50 X
IU 0.24 1.56 X
CiU 0.43 1.54 X
EAJ-PNV 0.06 1.47 X
Slovenia
(1996)
LDS 0.22 1.31 X 0.16
SLS 0.26 1.26 X
SD 0.14 1.13 X
SKD 0.01 0.95 X
Sweden
(1998)
SAP 0.24 1.55 X 0.28
MS 0.02 1.53 X
VP 0.55 1.51 X
KD 0.29 1.33 X
CP 0.16 1.78 X
FP 0.45 1.57 X
Switzerland
(1999)
SVP/UDC 0.78 1.35 X 0.37
SPS/PSS 0.03 1.46 X
FDP/PLR 0.81 1.54 X
CVP/PDC 0.47 1.67 X
GLP/PVL 0.11 1.51 X
The list of party abbreviations can be found in Appendix 1.
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K.B. Busch / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 159e178176Appendix 6. Model 1 with separate introduction of levels 1e3.Fixed part 1-Level Model 2-Level Model 3-Level Model
ß coefﬁcients, unstandardized
Fixed effects (with robust std. errors) Fixed effects (with non- robust std. errors)#
Intercept 3 1.514*** 1.624*** 1.509***
Don't Like 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.167***
Like Strongly 0.105*** 0.099*** 0.099***
Ideological Distance 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.037***
Education 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
Age 0.000* 0.000* 0.000***
Female 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
Party's Change 0.001 0.033
Previous Vote Share 0.003* 0.002
Party Age 0.001** 0.001*
Left-Right Family 0.020 0.015
Party Divergence 0.139** 0.140**
In Government t1 0.052 0.046
Issue: Party Politics 0.092***
Issue: Leader Politics 0.069**
Overall/Total PS Change 0.544***
Party System Polar. 0.027+
Multiparty System 0.119*
ENPP 0.044*
Age of Democracy 0.003***
Random effects Variance Components (V.C.) and degrees of freedom (d.f.) V.C. d.f. V.C d.f. V.C. d.f.
Intercept 1 r0 0.023*** 85 0.028*** 79 0.027*** 79
Ideological Distance Slope, r1 0.001*** 109 0.001*** 85
Level 3, Intercept 1/2 u00 0.116*** 24 0.010*** 24 0.000 17
Ideological Distance, Intercept 2 u20 e 0.000* 24
Log likelihood 89470470000 88782150000 88766170000
N (individual/party dyads) 1150642 150642 150642
N parties 113 113 113
N systems 25 25 25
***p < .001, two sided, **p < .01, two sided, *p < .05 two-sided, þp < .05 one-sided.
# Since the number of level 3 units was too small, the ﬁxed effects were calculated with non-robust standard errors.The differences to the estimation of ﬁxed effects with
robust standard errors were negligible. All effects ﬁxed except for ‘Ideological Distance’ both on party and system level. Education and Age are group mean centred. The
random effectspart displayed, here, is calculated with the unstandardized analysis. The chi-square statistics reported above are based on only 110 of 113 level 2 units, which
d on all the data.Appendix 7. Respondents' estimation proximity to lefteright
party positions with left-right position change and an
Interaction effect of young party systems * change
had sufﬁcient data for computation. Fixed effects and variance components are baseFixed part Beta coefﬁcients, (unstandardized)
Intercept 3 1.673***
Don't Like 0.167***
Like Strongly 0.099***
Ideological Distance 0.037***
Education* 0.016***
Age* 0.000***
Female 0.037***
Party's Change 0.032
PrVote Share 0.003+
Party Age 0.001*
Left-Right Family 0.017
Party Divergence 0.120**
In Government t1 0.037
Issue: Party Politics 0.079**
Issue: Leader Politics 0.071*
Overall/Total L-R Change 0.543***
Multiparty System 0.086
ENPP 0.030
Age of Democracy 0.002
Young 0.133
Young*Overall Change 0.091
Random effects Variance
Comp.
df c2 p-
value
Intercept 1, r0 0.026 79 4602.649 <0.001
Ideological distance
slope, r2
0.001 85 1227.106 <0.001
Level 3,
Intercept1/2 u00
0.000 16 20.097 0.215
Ideological distance,
Intercept 2, u20
0.000 24 40.314 0.020
Log likelihood 88763350000.00
N (individual/party
dyads)
194351
N parties 113
N systems 25
***p < .001, two sided, **p < .01, two sided, *p < .05 two-sided, þp < .05 one-sided.
Since the number of level 3 units was too small, the ﬁxed effects were calculated
with non-robust standard errors. The differences to the estimation of ﬁxed effects
with robust standard errors were negligible. All effects ﬁxed except for ‘Ideological
Distance’, which is random both on party and system level. Education and Age are
group mean centred. The random effects part displayed, here, is calculated with the
unstandardized analysis. The chi-square statistics reported above are based on only
110 of 113 level 2 units, which had sufﬁcient data for computation. Fixed effects and
variance components are based on all the data.
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